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TMM FOR WINPAC  
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA  
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP  
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP  
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP  
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR  
NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2019  
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA  
(SFO-GVA-III): JULY 23, 2009 SESSION

REF: A. GENEVA 0617 (SFO-GVA-III-002)  
[1](#)B. 08 GENEVA 0476 (JCIC-XXXIV-013)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-III-003.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: July 23, 2009  
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)3. (S) The U.S. and Russian delegations continued their discussions at the U.S. Mission on Thursday, July 23, 2009 beginning with comments by A/S Gottemoeller on the Russian-proposed language on right of withdrawal for Supreme National Interests (REF A). (Begin note: The Russian-proposed language explicitly referred to "a qualitative and quantitative buildup in the capabilities of missile defense systems" as a justification. End note.) Gottemoeller offered that the formulation of a general clause on withdrawal has been standard in most arms control treaties; it permits each Party to decide for itself when and if to exercise its right to withdraw from the treaty according to its supreme national interests. By adding specific conditions to the clause, the Russian side was muddying a clean legal right to withdraw.

[1](#)4. (S) Gottemoeller then raised the issue of how to respond to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine regarding their desire for security assurances and involvement in the START Follow-on negotiations. Gottemoeller reported that Vice President Biden had just concluded a visit to Ukraine where he had conveyed to the President of Ukraine in private and publicly

in a speech, that the U.S. was committed to the 1994 Budapest Summit statement security assurances. While his speech had only one sentence on this subject, the Ukrainian press had captured it as the headliner for its coverage of the VP visit. With respect to Kazakhstan, Gottemoeller said U/S Burns had visited Astana to deliver a similar message to President Nazarbayev. Gottemoeller noted that while our relationship with Belarus had been somewhat distant, there was a slight warming and there had been discussion of the possibility that either or both A/S Gordon and Gottemoeller would travel to Minsk to deliver the same message on security guarantees.

¶15. (S) Antonov initially responded neuralgically that it was not necessary to compete for the status of being the first to reassure Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on security guarantees, complaining that the United States had not discussed the idea with the Russian Federation prior to making a public statement. Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that, as they had discussed at the previous Geneva session, both Parties should look for every opportunity to reassure Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine regarding the continuity of the security assurances in the Budapest Summit statement.

¶16. (S) Antonov reported on his meeting with Ukrainian MFA arms control chief, Amb Nykonenko, the previous week. Nykonenko repeated the same points he had raised in the JCIC in June (REF B), asking for a legally-binding security assurances document open for signature by the other P5 members. Nykonenko also proposed that the United States and Russia meet in Kyiv to hold a session of the START Follow-on discussions. This, according to Nykonenko, would relieve some of the political pressure that was building over the exclusion of Ukraine from the negotiations.

¶17. (S) Although he opposed providing legally-binding assurances, Antonov suggested including language praising the three states in the preamble of the START Follow-on Treaty in order to address the Ukrainian concerns, and also to address concerns expressed by Kazakhstan and Belarus. He also

proposed that the U.S. and Russia issue a bilateral joint statement at the time when the START treaty expires.

¶18. (S) Gottemoeller also discussed how to organize for further work of the delegations. She suggested that working groups modeled on those that were set up during the START negotiations should be established and that they should begin their work at our next session at the end of August. Antonov said that Russia had not seen the text of the U.S.-proposed treaty. It would be necessary for Russia to have the U.S. proposal before a decision could be made on working groups, because it would only be at this point that it would be clear there was work for the working groups to do.

¶19. (S) The Parties agreed to next meet in Geneva August 31-September 4 to begin serious work on the Treaty text, which Gottemoeller promised to provide a week in advance.

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SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST CLAUSE  
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¶10. (S) Gottemoeller proposed to start the discussions where the Delegations had ended the prior afternoon and then move to the two remaining issues on the agenda: the discussion on the interaction with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine regarding the expiration of START, and discussion of procedures and the schedule for further work of the Delegations. Antonov agreed with the proposed agenda, and provided four papers in Russian as he had promised the day before. (Begin comment: See paragraph 41 "Documents exchanged" for list of documents. End comment.)

¶11. (S) Gottemoeller began by making a point on the Supreme National Interest clause as proposed by Russia in the "final provisions" paper. Gottemoeller stated that a general Supreme National Interest clause appeared in the same format

and text across many arms control treaties. This formulation allowed for each Party to decide for itself when it chose to exercise the Supreme National Interest clause. Gottemoeller recalled the example of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Passing a copy of the Department of State's ABM Treaty Fact Sheet (December 13, 2001) to Antonov, Gottemoeller stated that it was her view that a general Supreme National Interest clause provides for whatever the Party chooses to determine as its reason for exercising the clause. Specific conditions should not be spelled out in detail in advance as a condition for withdrawal.

¶12. (S) Reading the fact sheet, Antonov noted that it said that Russia had reduced strategic offensive arms in accordance with the START Treaty and that Russia was not an enemy of the United States; therefore, the United States had determined that it was in the U.S. national interest to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This was very interesting logic. This was why this issue would need to be discussed in more detail.

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PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINE,  
BELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN  
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¶13. (S) Gottemoeller turned to a discussion of security assurances for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The overall view that the United States was taking was to try and convey at a high level to the Governments of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and to the extent we could to Belarus, that the United States was committed to the 1994 Budapest Security assurances. The week after the Moscow Summit, Under Secretary William Burns went to Astana to deliver this message to President Nazarbayev. This week, Vice President Biden had visited Ukraine and delivered this message both privately to President Yushchenko and in a public speech delivered on Wednesday, July 22. In the speech, Vice President Biden stated, "We also reaffirmed the security assurances that the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom provided Ukraine in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum." Even though it was only one sentence in the speech, the Ukrainian press picked it up as the headline in its press reports. (Begin note: Gottemoeller provided a copy of the text from the White House web page of the Vice President's speech and several Ukrainian press articles/ End note.) With regard to Belarus, it was a known fact that our relationship with Belarus had been distant. Nevertheless, there had been a slight warming of our relations. Gottemoeller mentioned that either she or A/S Gordon or both may travel to Minsk to deliver this same message. We realize that we have work to do in this area and look forward to hearing about Russia's interactions and also any proposals for joint work.

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OVERREACTION TO  
U.S. INITIATIVE  
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¶14. (S) Antonov thanked Gottemoeller for the papers and said that he would study carefully the Vice President's statement. After a very long pause, Antonov said his first reaction was that perhaps the two Sides were a bit late in the discussion of this topic. It seems now that the Russian Side should have initiated this discussion a bit earlier. Antonov said he did not personally believe that the United States and Russia had to compete with each other as to which would be the first to reaffirm the security assurances. It was regrettable that the United States did not have enough time to discuss the idea with Russia prior to making such a far-reaching statement. Misreading one of the Ukrainian press reports that Gottemoeller had provided, Antonov commented that there must have been a document signed and ratified, claiming that it appeared that this was a legally-binding document and he asked for a copy. (Begin comment: One of the articles - in Russia - on the Vice President's speech contained a parenthetical, but long, paragraph on Rada Chairman Litvin's call for legally-binding

security assurances. End comment.)

¶15. (S) Gottemoeller responded saying that if Antonov would read the speech carefully, it was clear that there had been only a single sentence on the issue in the Vice President's speech. This was consistent with the commitment the United States had made that we were beginning the process of maintaining assurances to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian press articles contained a great deal of editorial comments. As the United States has said, we will provide assurances of our 1994 Budapest commitments whenever an opportunity arises individually and we will look for opportunities together. In that context there may be opportunities to do so with the United Kingdom as well. This is an area where the United States and Russia are in agreement and in the best position to extend assurances. The timing of the statement was associated with the timing of the high-level visit.

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MOSCOW'S APPROACH  
TO ASSURANCES  
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¶16. (S) Antonov said Russia would not be making any "populist comments" on our work, nor would it be going to capitals to reaffirm or extend assurances without consulting with the United States in advance. Noting that even though Russia was linked with Kazakhstan and Belarus through the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia still would just listen and not give any guarantees or any promises to anyone without joint consultations with the United States first, adding that this was probably not something that Belarus or Kazakhstan would want to hear given their alliance with Russia. He asked that we not compete for who would be more supportive of Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine.

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UKRAINE'S VISIT TO MOSCOW  
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¶17. (S) Antonov reported on his discussions with Ukrainian arms control chief, Amb Nykonenko, on July 17, 2009. Antonov said that he had given a detailed briefing on the START Follow-on talks to Nykonenko, but had not given any details of the U.S. position. He had briefed on the general plan and on the Joint Understanding signed by our Presidents earlier in July, and explained the reasons why Russia believed this treaty needs to be bilateral.

¶18. (S) According to Antonov, Nykonenko argued that Ukraine deserves to be present at the negotiating table and that there is considerable resentment in Kyiv on being excluded. There were many reasons, among them Ukraine's expertise in START verification, a broad range of technical expertise in the subject areas and finally the fact that Ukraine had not completed the process of elimination of its SS-24 ICBMs. Antonov said he was very concerned about Ukraine's statements at the JCIC, and repeated during Nykonenko's visit to Moscow, on its legal right to build non-nuclear strategic offensive arms. Nykonenko said if Ukraine is not involved in the negotiations, it needed to think about its own defense requirements. Nykonenko claimed the issue of security assurances was more acute for Ukraine than Belarus or Kazakhstan. Ukraine was not yet a member of NATO. (Begin comment: Antonov emphasized the word "yet." End Comment.) Belarus and Kazakhstan were both members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Antonov reported that Ukraine requested that Russia not just reaffirm its commitments, but develop and reinforce them through a legally-binding document open for signature by other P-5 nations. The idea would be for the P-5 to respond should Ukraine be pressured by a third state. It appeared, he said, that Ukraine does not think that the UNSC is a sufficient mechanism to solve problems.

¶19. (S) Antonov said Nykonenko next reiterated Ukraine's proposal, first tabled in the June JCIC, to convene an extraordinary session of the JCIC. In addition, Nykonenko

proposed that Russia, the United States and Ukraine think about the possibility of holding a trilateral meeting on the margins of the next round of START Follow-on negotiations, which could be held in Kyiv. Nykonenko stated that this would ease resentment by many in Ukraine caused by the abandonment of Ukraine in the START Follow-on negotiations. Such an effort would show how important the United States and Russia believe it is for Ukraine not to possess nuclear weapons. Nykonenko reminded Antonov that Ukraine was once the third largest nuclear power in the world. Antonov commented that while Nykonenko, being a skilled diplomat, did not speak to the issue of the non-nuclear status of Ukraine, some of his colleagues gave indications that not everyone in Ukraine is happy about Ukraine's decision to give up its nuclear arsenal.

¶20. (S) Nykonenko said that he would like to continue the discussion in September. Antonov said he informed Nykonenko that he would be sharing the information with the United States and Nykonenko offered to also share with his U.S. colleagues. Antonov reaffirmed that his basic reaction to Nykonenko was that he was just listening, that Russia was ready to consider all Ukraine's proposals and that it wanted to understand the arguments put forward by Ukraine. He assessed, though, that providing assurances via a legally-binding document was not a good idea. It would inspire "me too" reactions from other NPT members and potentially create a tier system in the non-nuclear community, with countries competing for more or better assurances from the nuclear states.

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MOSCOW HAS A PLAN  
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¶21. (S) Reading from a paper, Antonov proposed the United States and Russia conclude a joint statement for publication at the time of the expiration of the START Treaty, which would include specific elements (full text of official translation follows below).

Begin text:

Official Translation

To be Turned over to the  
U.S. Side

Paper of the Russian Side

July 23, 2009

On a Draft Joint Statement in Connection with the  
Expiration of the Treaty on the Reduction and  
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

With respect to the persistent inquiries of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine on reaffirmation of the security guarantees to those countries, recorded in the 1994 Budapest Memoranda, we would like to propose to the U.S. that the sides consider the possibility of adopting a Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in connection with the expiration of the START Treaty.

In this document the Parties could:

¶1. Take note of the significant contribution of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to successful implementation of the START Treaty and express their appreciation of the fact that these countries have completely fulfilled all the obligations assumed under the Lisbon Protocol.

¶2. Stress the importance of the agreed withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of these countries and their accession to the NPT as "non-nuclear" states in the context of the historic role of the START Treaty, which helped to strengthen the NPT regime, as well as international security and strategic stability in general.



¶3. Take note of the constructive participation of these countries in the work of the JCIC.

¶4. Welcome the commitment of these countries to maintaining the status of non-nuclear-weapon states.

¶5. Stress that the adoption of non-nuclear status has enhanced the security of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. State that the guarantees recorded in the Budapest Memoranda will remain in force even after the expiration of the START Treaty on December 5, 2009.

¶6. Reaffirm their obligations to these countries to refrain from the threat or use of force against their territorial integrity or political independence and to refrain from economic coercion. In the event that these countries are victims of an act of aggression or a threat of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons, seek immediate action by the UN Security Council to render assistance to these countries as non-nuclear-weapon States-Parties to the NPT.

We would ask the U.S. side to present its views in this regard. If there are no objections in principle, we would be willing to prepare a draft Joint Statement for consideration at the next round of negotiations.

End text.

¶22. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for his report on this discussion with Ukraine. Since Ukraine wished to play a significant role in the CD regarding the Negative Security Assurances Group, she asked whether this had come up in Nykonenko's discussions in Moscow.

¶23. (S) Antonov turned to Russian CD Representative Vasiliev, who said that it had not come up in Moscow; however, when Ukraine was asked whether it wanted to head another group besides the Negative Security Assurances Group, it rejected the offer. Ukraine remained very interested in this issue.

¶24. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Vasiliev and noted that the Russian Delegation had come up with a very interesting list of proposed statements, but questioned whether Russia had considered any joint actions with the United Kingdom to discuss implementation of the Budapest Memorandum.

¶25. (S) Antonov noted that Russia's friend Belarus just accused the United States of a violation of the Budapest Memorandum and Antonov was firmly convinced that Ukraine would speak about Russian violations after the Vice President's statement. This is a difficult time during the pre-election period in Ukraine until November. Before he had proposed the draft preamble, he said he had thought a lot about the approach and wondered if there needed to be anything more done to reaffirm the Budapest statement. He noted that Kotkova had given a legal presentation to the Ukrainians that there is no relationship between the Budapest Memorandum and the START Treaty and it did not matter whether START expires. But Nykonenko, as well as the Belarusians and Kazakhstanis, pointed out that there were political aspects to this problem, so Russia decided to consider these concerns in a positive way, noting that Russia had not discussed its approach with those three states before discussing it with the U.S. Delegation.

¶26. (S) Gottemoeller noted that there was no disagreement on the approach and she hoped that Russia would take every opportunity to express commitment to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the assurances of the Budapest statement whether Russia chooses to inform the United States or not. The objective was to make sure the path out of START was a smooth one. The U.S. was ready to work with the Russian Federation. Indeed, this is a point of agreement. With regard to our commitments to these countries she noted that, just last week in Washington, she had briefed the Ukrainian and Kazakhstani

Ambassadors on the progress of our START Follow-on negotiations. As had been agreed, she reemphasized that the current negotiations were bilateral, as laid out by our Presidents in London, and took the opportunity to further reassure them with regard to the 1994 Budapest assurances. It was interesting that both ambassadors asked about the bilateral format for START and whether it must remain so. When she emphasized that it would continue to be bilateral, there was no further comment from either of them. Gottemoeller said it was interesting that Antonov got a lot of comments from Nykonenko. It is obvious that he was hearing more in Moscow than we were in Washington. Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for his idea on the Joint Statement, saying that the United States had no desire to proceed in a unilateral manner and was ready to discuss further the Russian ideas.

127. (S) Antonov responded saying that Gottemoeller's statement was really important and he would proceed with the understanding that the United States would not act unilaterally. Together, he would like to work on a serious statement and would like very much to remove all concern of our Ukrainian friends. This should be a topic of discussion at our next session at the beginning of September.

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ORGANIZATION FOR  
FUTURE WORK  
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128. (S) Gottemoeller addressed the last topic on the agenda. The U.S. Delegation had prepared a short non-paper on its views of the structure and organization for future work of the Delegations. The Delegations were facing an enormous volume of work to complete a treaty by December 2009. The U.S. Delegation believed the work could be done most efficiently by drawing on our common START negotiations experience. Working groups modeled on those used during the START negotiations could be used for our START Follow-on negotiations. Also, the U.S. believed that the work should begin in earnest at the end of August and the working groups should plan to meet continuously from September 21 through November 20, 2009.

129. (S) Handing over the paper, Gottemoeller explained her proposed approach about meeting continuously in Geneva. This meant meeting in Geneva in working groups throughout the period as appropriate and as the working group chairs agreed. Each working group would set a schedule for their work during the period. It did not necessarily mean that the working group had to be working in Geneva continuously unless it was necessary. Each working group would prepare a Joint Draft Text as quickly as possible to identify issues for resolution. The Heads of Delegation would then meet to discuss and resolve issues as needed. The U.S. Delegation believed it was necessary to have the potential to meet continuously, but the flexibility to have working group chairs set the schedule was important.

130. (S) Gottemoeller identified the following working groups and their respective U.S. chairs: Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group - Ambassador Marcie Ries; Inspection Protocol Working Group - Dr. Ted Warner; Conversion or Elimination Protocol Working Group - Mr. Mike Elliott; Notifications Protocol Working Group - Mr. Kurt Siemon; Telemetry Protocol Working Group - Mr. Kurt Siemon; Memorandum of Understanding Working Group - Mr. Richard Trout. Gottemoeller explained that, from the U.S. perspective, the working groups were responsible for leading the interagency effort in Washington in preparing drafts of text and for preparing the Joint Draft Text with their Russian counterparts to identify issues for discussion and resolution by Heads of Delegation. The U.S. Delegation was proposing that the working groups could meet perhaps on the final two days of our next session to begin the organization of our work. Then, from September 5-20, both Delegations would be back in their respective capitals preparing for further negotiations to return to Geneva on September 21 to

begin continuous negotiations through November 20. A draft treaty would be prepared and ready to be initialed by November 20 and the period between November 20 and December 5 would be taken up with preparation for signing.

¶31. (S) Gottemoeller explained that with U.S. optimism comes pragmatism also. Thus, the U.S. Delegation was proposing that the Heads of Delegation have a "stock-taking" mid-way through the timeframe on October 21 to review the work up to that point and provide appropriate adjustment to the schedule as necessary. The goal was to have the document ready for signature on or about December 1, 2009. This was the combination of optimism and pragmatism that had informed our planning thus far. The U.S. Delegation looks forward to comments from our Russian colleagues.

¶32. (S) Antonov said that he very much liked the schedule. All his colleagues were happy to stay here in Geneva because they liked it very much. The U.S. approach could work if Russia were provided a copy of the U.S.-proposed treaty and, likewise, if the United States had a copy of the Russian-proposed treaty. This process has begun with the documents Russia had provided during this session and Russia will provide another package of documents with its proposals on some parts of the treaty when the two Sides next meet in September.

¶33. (S) Antonov commented that he doubted the ability of the working groups to solve the hardest problems when our Presidents were not able to reach consensus. It was not by accident that the same questions were raised during this round of negotiations. These are key points of difference. Antonov said that he did not reject the U.S. ideas put forth on future work. However, being accustomed to working in Asia, he did not like to make big movements, but small steps; he preferred day-to-day quiet progress. He anticipated that the next round would take a great deal of time and was planning for four days of work. In addition, there were CFE issues that needed to be discussed. Russia's plan was to present its approach, explain its logic, provide arguments as to why it enshrines the principles in such a way, and understand the U.S. logic, expressing his hope that the United States would provide all points and aspects of its draft. Only when the Sides managed to remove differences on the most important issues could we then instruct some working groups to work on the technical aspects of the text. Antonov stressed that it was essential that the working groups not deal with political problems. As he had mentioned several times, the statement by his President in Helsinki guided the work of the Delegation. This was important. The President was very decisive - if key concerns are removed, we could work on the document. The U.S. proposal was made as if there were no differences in principle, with only technical work remaining. Before the technical work begins, we have a lot of work to finish. If in three days we solve the problems, our working groups can begin their work. Despite all this, the U.S. optimism was appreciated. But Russia needed to wait to see the result of the work.

¶34. (S) Gottemoeller stated that it was important to clarify several points. The Russian Delegation has been clear with regard to what are major political and substantive issues. That has been helpful. For example, the U.S. Delegation found it very useful that the Russian Delegation had made a presentation of positions and prepared actual text. The U.S. expects to reflect those formulations in the treaty text it is working on to be ready by August 24. That does not mean that the United States is prepared to put them in the document without brackets. Russia would also likely want to bracket some of the U.S.-proposed text.

¶35. (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov for clarification on something he had said, noting that she wanted to make clear that she had not heard the verb as he spoke, but the interpreter had stated "may not work on treaty text" until principled issues were resolved. Antonov replied that this interpretation was not accurate, as yesterday's work was an example of work on three critical issues even though



substantive disagreements still remained. What was important was the text that we give to the Presidents must be without brackets.

¶36. (S) Gottemoeller noted that there was significant technical work to do even without wrestling with political issues, but the working groups needed to engage early. We understand that it is not good to "buy a pig in a poke." It will be important to wait to see our draft texts and we look forward to the Russian proposals.

¶37. (S) Antonov said that all understood that our work was being reviewed at the highest levels in both Russia and the United States, saying that not every international instrument gets this sort of attention, and not just by Foreign Minister Lavrov and Minister of Defense Serdyukov. Before Russia presented a document, there needed to be acceptance at the highest level of its government. If the highest level approves, it will be difficult to change. Even the most skillful and proficient experts will not change it. In closing he said that his instruction is to finish the new treaty by START expiration so, he concluded, we must do it.

¶38. (S) Gottemoeller emphasized that the call for continuous session did not mean that all the members of the Delegations were here in Geneva at the same time. Both Heads of Delegation had other issues to tend to. It was up to the co-chairs to take responsibility to plan the work.

¶39. (S) Antonov agreed, saying let's work toward August and see what we manage to accomplish.

¶40. (S) Begin text (U.S. Delegation Non-Paper on "U.S. Views on Structure and Organization for START Follow-on Negotiations"):

U.S. Non-Paper  
July 23, 2009

U.S. Views on Structure and Organization for  
START Follow-on Negotiations

In order to accomplish the enormous volume of work necessary to complete a START Follow-on Treaty by December 5, 2009, the U.S. Delegation believes that this work could best be done most efficiently by drawing from the structure that was used during the START negotiations. In particular, we believe that working groups modeled on those that were set up during the START negotiations, should be established for the START Follow-on negotiations. We also believe that such groups should begin in earnest at our next session at the end of August, and that they should plan to meet in a continuous negotiating session between September 21 and November 20, ¶2009.

In this regard, the U.S. proposes that we establish six Working Groups to support the START Follow-on Negotiations. Additionally, the U.S. is prepared to announce the associated U.S. Chairpersons for each group.

Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group  
U.S. Chair: Ambassador Marcie Ries

Inspection Protocol Working Group  
U.S. Chair: Dr. Ted Warner

Conversion or Elimination Protocol Working Group  
U.S. Chair: Mr. Mike Elliott

Notifications Protocol Working Group  
U.S. Chair: Mr. Kurt Siemon

Telemetry Protocol Working Group  
U.S. Chair: Mr. Kurt Siemon

Memorandum of Understanding Working Group  
U.S. Chair: Mr. Richard Trout

End text.

¶41. (S) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- Non-paper on U.S. Views on Structure and Organization for START Follow-on Negotiations, dated July 23, 2009

- Russia:

-- Russian non-paper on Draft Preamble to the New Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (Proposals of the Russian Side), dated July 23, 2009;

-- Russian non-paper on a Draft Resolution "Bilateral Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arms and the New Framework for Strategic Relations," dated July 23, 2009;

-- Russian non-paper on "Draft Concluding Provisions of the New Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms" (Proposals of the Russian Side), dated July 23, 2009;

-- Russian non-paper "On Basing and Temporary Stationing of Strategic Offensive Arms Outside the National Territory of Each Party," dated July 23, 2009; and

-- Russian non-paper "On a Draft Joint Statement in Connection with the Expiration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," dated July 23, ¶2009.

¶42. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller  
Amb Ries  
Mr. Brown  
Mr. Buttrick  
Lt Col Comeau  
Mr. Dunn  
Mr. Elliott  
Mr. Fortier  
Mr. Johnston  
Mr. Siemon  
Mr. Taylor  
Dr. Warner  
Ms. Gross (Int)  
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov  
Mr. Belyakov  
Mr. Izrazov  
Ms. Kotkova  
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov  
Mr. Leontiev  
Mr. Luchaninov  
Mr. Malyugin  
Mr. Neshin  
Mr. Novikov  
MGen Orlov  
Mr. Pischulov  
Mr. Rudenko  
Col Ryzhkov  
Mr. Shevchenko  
Mr. Smirnov  
Mr. Tarasov  
Mr. Trifonov  
Mr. Vasiliev  
Ms. Vodopolova  
Mr. Zaitsev  
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶43. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
CLINTON